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Abstract
We present an explicit formula that produces hash collisions for the
Merkle-Damg˚ard construction. The formula works for arbitrary choice
of message block and irrespective of the standardized constants used in
hash functions, although some padding schemes may cause the formula
to fail. This formula bears no obvious practical implications because
at least one of any pair of colliding messages will have length double
exponential in the security parameter. However, due to ambiguity in
existing definitions of collision resistance, this formula arguably breaks
the collision resistance of some hash functions.
1 Introduction
Collision resistance is one of the fundamental desirable properties of a hash
function. Since hash values are often used as digital fingerprints, it should
be difficult to find pairs of messages with the same hash value.
The main contribution of this paper is a formula that deterministically
produces partial or full collisions for Merkle-Damg˚ard hash functions, such
as MD5, SHA1, and the SHA2 family. The formula provides collisions on
the iterated compression function for any Merkle-Damg˚ard hash function.
It may or may not provide full collisions depending on the padding scheme
and limitations on input length. In the case of MD5, the formula yields full
collisions. It does not provide full collisions for SHA1 and SHA256 due to
the requirement that inputs have fewer than 264 bits.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
10
66
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
1 A
ug
 20
18
After explaining the formula, we show that it produces messages with
length double exponential in the security parameter, and that this method-
ology probably cannot be used to find colliding messages of sub-exponential
length. However, the colliding messages are highly redundant and can be
compressed to logarithmic space. Because of ambiguity in the existing defi-
nitions of collision resistance, we point out that one can arguably perform a
trivial collision attack by simply writing out the collision formula.
2 Background
The Merkle-Damg˚ard construction has been used to design some of the most
commonly used hash functions. The construction is conceptually simple: the
input message is read one block at a time to iteratively update an internal
state, and after all blocks have been read, the final internal state is used to
derive the hash value.
More specifically, the construction specifies a block length b, an output
length n, an internal state size `, an initial internal state IV , and a com-
pression function f : {0, 1}b × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}`. The following steps are
performed to determine the hash value:
1. Pad the input so that the total length is a multiple of the block length.
2. Initialize the internal state IV .
3. Read in the individual blocks of the input; for each block B, update
IV as
IV ← f(B, IV ).
4. Once all blocks have been read, derive the hash value from the final
value of IV .
Note that the inner workings of the construction are much like a DFA, with
states corresponding to the possible values of IV and transitions determined
by the blocks of the padded message.
The functions MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 share some similarities: all three
use b = 512, let ` = n, and simply output the final value of IV as the hash
value. They also use the same padding scheme (up to endianness), which
works as follows:
1. Append a single “1” bit to the input.
2. Append “0” bits until the total length is equivalent to 448 modulo 512.
2
3. Append the input length as a 64-bit integer, producing a padded mes-
sage with length a multiple of 512.
If the input has 264 or more bits, then its length cannot be encoded in a 64-bit
integer. In this case, MD5 simply uses the lowest order 64 bits of the input
length [6]. The NIST standardizations of SHA1 and SHA256, meanwhile,
prohibit these long inputs [5].
If we fix the block B ∈ {0, 1}b in the compression function f , the result
is a function fB : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}`. An ideal hash function should be diffi-
cult to distinguish from a random function; therefore, if a hash function is
well designed, then we expect fB to behave as a randomly chosen function
from {0, 1}` to itself. Consequently, hash functions are sometimes studied by
examining the expected asymptotic properties of random mappings on finite
domains. We now define and state some of these properties.
Definition 1: Suppose X is a finite set, and let f : X → X. The functional
graph of f is the directed graph Gf with vertex set
V = X
and edge set
E = {(x, f(x)) | x ∈ X}.
In general, each component of any functional graph will have a central
directed cycle and some directed trees leading to the cycle [4]. Next, we
define some of the properties of nodes in a functional graph:
Definition 2: Suppose f : X → X. For any x ∈ X:
1. The tail length λ(x) of x is the minimum length of a directed path from
x to a cyclic node in Gf .
2. The cycle length µ(x) of x is the length of the cycle in the component
containing x.
3. The rho length ρ(x) of x is the sum of its tail and cycle lengths, ρ(x) =
λ(x) + µ(x).
Following are some expected properties of individual nodes in random func-
tional graphs, as given in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography :
Theorem 1 [4]: Suppose |X|= N . If x ∈ X and f : X → X are chosen
uniformly at random, then the expected tail, cycle, and rho lengths of x are
asymptotically given as follows:
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1. λ(x) ∼√piN/8
2. µ(x) ∼√piN/8
3. ρ(x) ∼√piN/2
Finally, we state expectations for some properties of the functional graph
itself:
Theorem 2 [4]: Suppose |X|= N , and f : X → X is chosen uniformly at
random. Then the following are asymptotically true as N →∞:
1. The expected number of cyclic nodes in Gf is ∼
√
piN/2.
2. The expected maximum tail length of a node in Gf is ∼ c1
√
N , where
c1 ≈ 0.78.
3. The expected maximum cycle length in Gf is ∼ c2
√
N , where c2 ≈ 1.74.
4. The expected maximum rho length in Gf is ∼ c3
√
N , where c3 ≈ 2.41.
While nodes in functional graphs can have variable in-degree, each has out-
degree 1, since f is a function. Starting from any node in any Gf , traversing
the out-edges will eventually lead us to a cycle.
Suppose now that we let X = {0, 1}`, the set of possible internal states
for a hash function, and choose f to be the the function fB obtained by fixing
a block B in the hash compression function. Let [B]k denote the message
consisting of the block B repeated k times. Observe that if we begin at the
node IV in the functional graph GfB and traverse k out-edges, we arrive at
the node
IV ′ = fkB(IV ) = fB(fB(. . . fB(IV ))).
The value IV ′ is also the intermediate internal state of a hash function after
processing k blocks that are all identical to B. This observation, and the
aforementioned facts about functional graphs, inspire our collision formula.
3 The Collision Formula
Arbitrarily fix a block B ∈ {0, 1}b in a hash function’s compression function
to obtain a function fB : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}`. Consider the messages
M0 = [B]
λ(IV ), M1 = [B]
λ(IV )+µ(IV ).
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When fB is applied iteratively to these messages one block at a time, the two
clearly agree after the first λ(IV ) blocks, since the messages are identical up
to that point. By the definition of λ(·), we see that these first λ(IV ) blocks
bring us to a cyclic node in the functional graph GfB . After the first λ(IV )
blocks, message M0 ends immediately, while M1 has µ(IV ) more blocks to
complete a full additional cycle in the functional graph. Starting from IV in
GfB , traversing λ(IV ) +µ(IV ) out-edges brings us to the same node as if we
only traverse λ(IV ) out-edges. Therefore, when M0 and M1 are passed to
our unspecified hash function, the two will collide directly prior to the final
padding block.
The above collision construction still works if we replace λ(IV ) with any
a ≥ λ(IV ), as any such value is sufficient to bring M0 and M1 into a cycle
in the functional graph. Furthermore, after M0 and M1 arrive at the same
cyclic node, the two can traverse the cycle any whole number of times and
still collide. Thus, we see that the messages
M0 = [B]
a+c1µ(IV ), M1 = [B]
a+c2µ(IV )
also collide for any a ≥ λ(IV ) and any natural numbers c1, c2. In fact, for
fixed a ≥ λ(IV ), the set {
[B]a+cµ(IV ) | c ∈ N}
is an infinite family of messages which mutually collide up until the final
padding blocks are processed.
There are two reasons that we do not yet have a full collision formula.
First, it is nontrivial to compute λ(IV ) and µ(IV ). From the results cited
in the previous section, these values are roughly 2`/2 each, and we tend to
have ` ≥ 128 in practice. Second, the mutually colliding messages all have
different lengths; hence, they are padded differently, so we should expect the
collisions to disappear once their final blocks are processed.
We begin by addressing the problem of computing λ(IV ) and µ(IV ).
While we should expect it to be infeasible in general to compute λ(IV ), we
do not need an exact value—it is sufficient simply to find a value a ≥ λ(IV ).
Since our functional graph GfB only has 2
` nodes, we know that λ(IV ) < 2`,
hence the choice a = 2` will suffice.
Similarly, we do not need to know the exact value of µ(IV )—we will
still have an infinite family of mutually colliding messages if we replace the
term cµ(IV ) with any multiple of µ(IV ). And while computing µ(IV ) is
probably infeasible, we know that µ(IV ) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2`}. Thus, (2`)! must
be a multiple of µ(IV ). We therefore obtain our formula that produces hash
collisions:
[B]2
`+c(2`)! (*)
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For any fixed block B, compression function fB, and any two values of c ∈ N,
we obtain a hash collision. Indeed, the set{
[B]2
`+c(2`)! | c ∈ N
}
is a subset of the infinite family of mutually colliding messages. As previously
mentioned, some padding schemes may thwart this formula. We have actually
already resolved this issue for some functions, however. The specification for
MD5, given in RFC 1321 [6], explicitly allows messages of arbitrary length:
if the input length is at least 264 bits, then the padding only uses the low
order 64 bits of the length in the padding. Therefore, for two messages to
receive the same MD5 padding, it is not necessary that they have the same
length—it is sufficient that their lengths be equivalent modulo 264. For MD5,
all messages produced by our formula have bit lengths that are multiples of
2` = 2128, so their lengths are all equivalent modulo 264. Hence, our formula
produces full collisions for MD5.
SHA1 and SHA256 have, respectively, ` = 160 and ` = 256. This means
that for these functions, all messages produced by our formula have equivalent
lengths modulo 264. However, the NIST standardizations of these functions,
given in FIPS 180-4 [5], require input messages to have fewer than 264 bits.
(This is not unreasonable—it is still difficult to envision a future in which
files with 264 bits are hashed. And allowing such long inputs allows for
some potent attacks [3].) All messages produced by our formula for SHA1
and SHA256 have lengths much greater than 264. For these functions, the
formula only produces collisions on the iterated compression function. If the
domains of SHA1 and SHA256 were extended in the natural way, our formula
would produce full collisions for these functions, too.
4 Analysis of Message Lengths
The messages produced by our formula are too long for SHA1 and SHA256,
but how long are they, really? The dominant term in the formula is (2`)!,
which is not a familiar quantity. We can, however, set upper and lower
bounds on it. The upper bound is obtained by replacing all 2` individual
factors with 2`, while the lower bound is obtained by neglecting the smallest
half of the terms and replacing all remaining terms with 2`/2 = 2`−1. We
obtain
(2`−1)2
`−1
< (2`)!< (2`)2
`
.
Rewriting these bounds as
22
`−1+log(`−1)
< (2`)!< 22
`+log `
,
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it becomes clear that (2`)! is double exponential in `. The number of b-
bit blocks in our messages is roughly c(2`)! (the term 2` is comparatively
negligible), so the total bit length of our messages is roughly
bc22
`
for arbitrary choice of c ∈ N. For typical values of ` with ` ≥ 128, it is safe to
say that such a message cannot ever be fully hashed, much less written out
in full. (The possible exception is the message with c = 0, but that message
has length b2`, which is still prohibitively large for the foreseeable future.)
Our collision formula is perhaps excessive—we upper bounded the tail and
cycle lengths in functional graphs by 2`, but by theorem 2, the maximum tail
and cycle lengths over the whole graph are on the order of 2`/2 in expectation.
This suggests a collision formula that still works in expectation but produces
smaller messages:
[B]d0.78·2
`/2e+c(d1.74·2`/2e)!
While the messages produced by this formula are objectively much shorter
than those produced by the first formula, these message lengths are still
double exponential in `/2. This does not bring us meaningfully closer to
practical message lengths. And if we further decrease the message lengths,
we correspondingly decrease the probability that the formula yields collisions.
Our formula exploits cycles in functional graphs to find collisions. This
method, at minimum, requires us to enter a cycle. By theorem 1, we know
that the average node is at distance
√
pi2`/8 ≈ 0.63 · 2`/2 from the nearest
cycle, so it is difficult to see how this method could produce colliding messages
much shorter than about 2`/2 bits.
The cycle lengths pose an even greater problem. Whereas our formula
only needs an upper bound on λ(IV ), it needs an exact multiple of µ(IV ),
and it is not obvious that we can find a small multiple of µ(IV ) without
determining µ(IV ). Since µ(IV ), like λ(IV ), has an expected value of about
0.63 · 2`/2, determining µ(IV ) in the straightforward way puts us roughly
even with a randomized birthday collision attack—and the colliding messages
found this way would still be too long for SHA1 and SHA256.
One idea for a cycle-based collision attack (and perhaps also a second
preimage attack) is to hope that, for our block choice B, the node IV is a
cyclic node. However, there are only about
√
pi2`/2 cyclic nodes out of 2`
total nodes, and it is unclear how to efficiently identify cyclic nodes.
Our formula identifies long colliding messages with virtually no work.
It does not seem, however, that there is a noteworthy length/time trade-
off here. Collisions found with this methodology necessarily have at least
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exponential length in expectation, and achieving single exponential length
straightforwardly requires exponential time.
5 Collision Resistance
While the messages produced by our collision formula are unimaginably long,
the very existence of a hash collision formula raises an interesting question:
does this formula technically break the collision resistance of some hash func-
tions?
Existing definitions of collision resistance are just vague enough that the
answer is arguably yes. Collision resistance is formalized in terms of keyed
hash functions and a “collision game”. Keyed hash functions differ from real
world hash functions in that they cannot be evaluated without knowledge
of a special key. Real world hash functions can be viewed as keyed hash
functions with standardized key values.
In a collision game [1] [2], a key is randomly generated, and an adver-
sary must produce messages which collide for that particular key. Roughly
speaking, a hash function is said to be collision resistant if its keyed variant
thwarts the adversary with overwhelming probability. There are several ver-
sions of the collision experiment—while the adversary is usually given the
key immediately, several variants [1] require the adversary to produce one or
both of the colliding messages before being given the key.
The adversary in the collision game must run in time polynomial in the
security parameter. A message of double exponential length requires double
exponential time to write out in full. However, the long colliding messages
produced by our collision formula are highly redundant, consisting of the
same block repeated many times. These long colliding messages can be com-
pressed to logarithmic space, O(log `+ log c), by simply writing out formula
(*) for two different values of c. The collision resistance definitions given
by [1] and [2] do not state that the colliding messages must be of polynomial
length, and they only state that the adversary must “output” the colliding
messages. Since these definitions do not explicitly state that the adversary
must write out the messages in full, it is arguably acceptable for the adversary
to provide compressed output.
If compressed output is allowed, then the adversary can win the collision
game with probability 1 under all models, including those which require the
adversary to produce collisions without knowledge of the chosen key. This is
because our formula is very general—it does not use any information about
hash function internals or key values. It only takes advantage of inevitable
properties of functions over finite domains.
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6 Conclusion
This hash collision formula is a theoretical curiosity. It does not compromise
collision resistance in any practical sense, and there is good reason to believe
that this methodology cannot be converted into a practical collision attack.
Nevertheless, it is theoretically ambiguous whether the formula compro-
mises the security of real world hash functions. If the adversary in the col-
lision game is allowed to give compressed output, then the formula trivially
breaks the collision resistance of MD5 and nearly does the same to SHA1
and SHA256. A collision attack on MD5 is perhaps unexciting, since col-
lisions can already be found in about 224.1 evaluations of the compression
function [7]. Our collision formula, however, produces collisions without any
evaluations of the compression function.
This collision attack is impractical, and can be theoretically ruled out by
tightening the definition of collision resistance. SHA1 and SHA256 already
accomplish this by placing limits on input message length. This defense can
be extended to all hash functions by specifying that adversaries must write
out colliding messages in full, or by requiring that the colliding messages
must have length polynomial in the security parameter.
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